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Abstract: 
State-centric law appears ill equipped to meet human rights’ emancipatory promise in an 
increasingly pluralistic, unequal world facing climate change. ‘Climate justice’ has become a 
counterpoint to hegemonic statist, neoliberal climate approaches. However, few studies address the 
confluence of competing norms (including rights), power relations and multiple actors in shaping, 
contesting and reinterpreting climate justice in specific contexts, despite burgeoning human rights 
and legal pluralism research. This article explores legal pluralism’s potential for understanding rights’ 
roles in climate justice through examining Norway. Legal pluralism reveals how Norwegian 
‘translators’ vernacularise transnational climate justice aspects, including international climate law 
and policy, into relevant movement frames, but within unequal power relations and hegemonic 
processes. These translators balance encouragement and critique of Norway’s high-profile 
international climate positioning, finding spaces within hegemonic discourses where movements can 
turn prevalent global, statist frames inward, decentering climate discourses by highlighting Norway’s 
structural links to climate injustice, particularly its petroleum industry. Rights are used in varying 
ways in both disaggregating diagnostic frames and stressing more prognostic, transformative visions. 
Increasingly, climate justice and Norwegian ‘klimarettferdighet’ [climate justice] discourses move 
from a focus on countering international, statist discourses to domestic distribution and economic 
transitions. This combines climate justice with Norwegian civic participatory and social democratic 
norms of active civil society and social movement involvement in socioeconomic transformations, 
providing potentially resonant frames for tackling climate change.  
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1. Introduction 
Climate change arises as state-based human rights law already disappoints its 
emancipatory promise in an increasingly plural global order. Rights must be approached 
differently if they are to offer an alternative that can challenge hegemonic neoliberal 
approaches to ecology. ‘Climate justice’ represents such a counter-narrative, often using 
rights. Nonetheless, while rights-based global climate governance blueprints generate 
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academic debate, few studies address competing norms, power relations and actors 
shaping, contesting and reinterpreting climate change in specific contexts. Meanwhile, 
legal pluralism and human rights scholarship has yet to address climate change. 
This article tentatively explores legal pluralism’s potential for understanding law and 
rights in climate justice by outlining legal pluralism, and its applicability to human rights 
and climate change, before tracing climate justice discourses, globally and in Norway.  
 
2. Legal Pluralism, Rights and Climate Change 
Legal pluralism, used as a descriptive-analytical tool,1 recognises that state-based law 
(often simply labelled ‘law’) exists alongside other normative and institutional orders. 
Several interconnected premises, increasingly applied to rights, emerge from this. Firstly, 
we must empirically examine these norms and institutions (including other state-based 
laws) to understand how state-based law translates from abstract texts to everyday life. 
Secondly, an actor-orientated approach is required to examine how state-based law, 
including rights, is translated or ‘vernacularised’, particularly collectively by 
communities and movements mobilising collective action frames. The concept of ‘semi-
autonomous social fields’2 describes how actors in social spaces between individuals and 
state institutions not only receive, but actively interpret and generate norms within 
constrained circumstances. Rights as living norms and institutions are not derivatives of 
human nature, nor ‘handed down (…) from a superior authority’, but socially 
‘produced’.3 This discursive, relational understanding acknowledges we ‘can no more 
step out of the normative universe (…) than (…) the physical’.4 Clashes between rights 
interpretations are therefore not only inevitable but necessary in a ‘fragmented, 
polycentric regime’.5  
Thirdly, given social fields are porous, we must study interactions between social fields 
at different levels. A ‘feedback loop’ between levels sees actors construct transnational 
norms and ‘pluralism (…) within international law’;6 indeed, law is already plural at 
domestic level. In dialectical encounters between and within fields, ‘the universal is 
localized and the vernacular is globalized’, giving rights a ‘nomadic character’.7 
Consequently, the term multi-scalar, rather than multi-level, is therefore more 
appropriate. Choice of scale(s) for frames is highly strategic. Rights interpretations 
                                                        
1 Rather than as an argument for recognising legal orders beyond state-based law. 
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become a ‘tool or language’; varying institutional openings ‘change the significance of 
what it means to use that language’.8  
Fourthly, interactions, spaces, scales, and the actors that move between and within them 
are uneven and unequal, bearing imprints of history. We must therefore acknowledge 
political economy and historical power relations. Considering living law as the outcome of 
historical struggles between unequal participants reflects Gramsci’s idea of ‘hegemony’ 
as a process between purposeful movements from above and below.9 For Merry, within 
these hegemonic processes, ‘translators’ negotiate between communities, formal 
standards and institutional openings — resonant frames might insufficiently confront 
existing practices, while non-resonant frames might be too challenging.10 ‘Local’ and 
‘global’ go ‘beyond spatial referents’, with local implying ‘recalcitrant particularity’ and 
global ‘cosmopolitan awareness’. 11  Legal pluralism imagines, instead, ‘multisited’ 
categories without unidirectional global-local or local-global causality:12 not only is 
state-based law pluralised, but plural norms are legalised and institutionalised. Both 
processes can swing from cooption by elite interests in hegemonic processes to 
recognition of alternative claims; the same norms can be relied on for different 
understandings of law and divergent framings reflecting contrasting historical moments. 
Gramsci viewed law within a ‘historical bloc’, a ‘discordant ensemble of (…) social 
relations’ that, in its material base and superstructure,13 contain ‘truce lines’ of past 
struggles.14 Similarly, Merry recognises ‘a temporal dimension’ to actor and movement 
mobilisation, whereby ‘knowledge about the world develops slowly’.15  
Rather than offering particular methods, pluralism is an orientation that does not 
privilege state-based law, but still recognises the influence of state-based norms and 
institutional openings in actor-movement strategies, and the state’s porous nature, the 
plural actors that constitute its different faces and speak on its behalf in different 
settings.  
In acknowledging actors cannot escape physical or normative contexts, legal pluralism 
could help recognise climate change as a material factor and a source of socio-legal 
norms (our responses to climatic changes) affecting rights’ lived reality. This introduces 
                                                        
8 Markus (n 6) 387. 
9 Kenneth Bo Nielsen and Alf Gunvald Nilsen, ‘Law Struggles and Hegemonic Processes in Neoliberal India: 
Gramscian Reflections on Land Acquisition Legislation’ (2015) 12(2) Globalizations 203, 205. 
10 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle’ in René 
Provost and Colleen Sheppard (eds), Dialogues on Human Rights and Legal Pluralism (Springer 2013) 207-
228, 213. 
11 ibid 211. 
12 Anne Griffiths, ‘Reviewing Legal Pluralism’ in Reza Banakar and Max Travers (eds), Law and Social 
Theory (Hart 2013) 269-286, 272. 
13 A Claire Cutler, ‘Gramsci, Law, and the Culture of Global Capitalism’ (2005) 8(4) Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 527, 534. 
14 Alf Gunvald Nilsen and Laurence Cox, ‘What Would a Marxist Theory of Social Movements Look Like?’ in 
Colin Barker et al (eds), Marxism and Social Movements (Brill 2013) 63-81, 66. 
15 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Global Legal Pluralism and the Temporality of Soft Law’ (2014) 46(1) Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 108, 120. 
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an ecological dimension to legal pluralism — norms are socially and materially co-
produced by unequal (human and non-human) actors in multi-scalar, semi-autonomous 
socio-ecological fields. Epistemic communities and socio-political constructions of 
science — scientific pluralism — thus muddy the waters further. Climate change 
permeates all socio-ecological fields, with overlapping norms and institutions refracting 
this permeation; thus, legal pluralism could be vital in exploring tensions between rights’ 
universalist aspirations and their context-dependent realisation under climatic changes. 
 
3. Climate Justice 
3.1. The ‘First Wave’: Roots of Climate Justice 
Climate justice is a transnational discourse of plural conceptions of climate change and 
justice from below that compete in hegemonic processes at multiple, overlapping scales. 
A legal pluralist analysis helps demonstrate this in how actors vernacularise and 
disaggregate internationalist, statist climate narratives, meeting them, firstly, at the 
global level, but becoming increasingly multi-scalar and future-orientated.  
Based on Scholsberg and Collins,16 climate justice encompasses three converging 
discursive spaces populated by different interpretations: academic debates, state-NGO 
policy arenas, and movements springing partly from North American ‘environmental 
justice’ movements. Thus, Indian ‘activist-scholars’ helped popularise the term17 
influenced by environmental justice, alongside ‘a concerted effort’ by certain Southern 
states to recognise differentiated historical responsibilities.18 Academic discourses often 
focus on applying existing justice principles and rights to climate change.19 While many 
environmental and climate justice movements are ‘made up largely of assertions of 
various rights’,20 Schlosberg suggests academic definitions are ‘too detached from (…) 
movements that use the idea;’ in practice, both ‘discourses of justice’ and ‘experiences 
(…) of injustice, inform how the concept is used’.21 Discourses of justice and injustice 
blend dialectically with normative and institutional openings at inter- and intra-state 
scales, including legal norms of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and rights. This characterised both the ‘first wave’ of climate interest in the 
early 1990s (when the UNFCCC was signed) and the ‘second wave’ in the late 2000s, 
represented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and high-profile 
UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COPs). 
                                                        
16 David Schlosberg and Lisette B Collins, ‘From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the 
Discourse of Environmental Justice’ (2014) 5(3) WIREs: Climate Change 359, 364. 
17 René Audet, ‘Climate Justice and Bargaining Coalitions: A Discourse Analysis’ (2013) 13(3) International 
Environmental Agreements 369, 370. 
18 Susannah Fisher, ‘The Emerging Geographies of Climate Justice’ (2014) 181(1) The Geographical Journal 
71, 73, 74. 
19 David Schlosberg, ‘Theorising Environmental Justice: The Expanding Sphere of a Discourse’ (2013) 
22(1) Environmental Politics 37, 46. 
20 Schlosberg and Collins (n 16) 365. 
21 Schlosberg (n 19) 50. 
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Law has thus played a major role in climate justice. Inclusion of justice-related principles 
in the UNFCCC (1992) reflected discourse of justice and injustice, including in long-
standing North-South UN divergences, providing foci for collective action frames for 
climate justice vernacularisation relevant to particular experiences of climate injustice; 
climate justice is often considered ‘a way to operationalize’22 the Common But 
Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) principle, and other concerns, listed in Article 3 
(‘Principles’), including intergenerational equity; that ‘developed’ states ‘should take the 
lead;’ ‘specific needs’ of ‘developing’ states; and the right to sustainable development.23 
Echoing legal pluralism’s premises, these open-ended principles are said to make 
climate justice ‘a jurist’s nightmare’ — ‘its meaning varies depending on the (…) actor 
that manipulates it, even if some of its semantic bases are institutionalised in legal 
texts’.24  
Early developments related to these top-down, statist institutional openings both reflect 
and parallel bottom-up climate justice movements stemming partly from particular 
historical discourse of justice and injustice in environmental justice movements. 
Environmental justice built on civil rights and feminist struggles against toxic waste in 
African American communities in the 1980s, consciously contrasting mainstream 
environmentalism’s ‘wilderness ethic’. Church groups were key.25 While the Clinton 
administration was relatively receptive, the Bush administration closed domestic 
institutional spaces; this, along with growing climate awareness, encouraged a ‘more 
international frame’, especially ‘redefining climate change as (…) [a] human rights 
issue’.26 This informed the first Climate Justice Summit at the 2000 Hague COP, 
developing into the International Climate Justice Network and 2002 Bali Principles of 
Climate Justice (based on the 1991 People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit 
Principles of Environmental Justice), acknowledging inequality, indigenous concerns27 
and declaring climate change ‘a human rights issue’ in attacking market principles 
guiding negotiations.28 A 2004 Climate Justice Declaration attacked carbon trading, 
arguing climate policy must not exacerbate existing injustices, and called for a just 
transition.29 Religious groups were still central, including the 2005 World Council of 
Churches’ Spiritual Declaration on Climate Change.30  
Thus, institutional openings (and closings) in hegemonic processes both for subnational 
movements with particular historical and politico-economic influences, and at the 
                                                        
22 Schlosberg and Collins (n 16) 365. 
23 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (entered into force 21 March 1994), United 
Nations Treaty Series, vol 1771, Art 3. 
24 Audet (n 17) 371. 
25 Ashley Dawson, ‘Climate Justice: The Emerging Movement against Green Capitalism’ (2010) 109(2) 
South Atlantic Quarterly 313, 326. 
26 ibid 327. 
27 Schlosberg and Collins (n 16) 366 
28 Dawson (n 25) 328. 
29 ibid 330. 
30 Hans A Baer, ‘The International Climate Justice Movement: A Comparison with the Australian Climate 
Movement’ (2011) 22(2) The Australian Journal of Anthropology 256, 257. 
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UNFCCC’s inter-state level, initially promoted international frames for climate justice. 
The ‘feedback loop’ between international law and social fields at other scales saw 
actors compare high-level statist debates and principles contained in climate law with 
their lived experience of climate injustice. As such, climate justice proponents became 
increasingly active at international scales. Other norms, including rights, offered 
alternatives to statist, neoliberal hegemonic framings; indeed rights’ universalism and 
own international legal status further bolstered global frames. 
3.2. The ‘Second Wave:’ Spillover and Frustration 
Increasing international participation encouraged ‘social movements spillover’; 31 
environmental and burgeoning climate justice norms found receptive audiences in 
environmental and global justice movements, critical of neoliberalism and technocratic 
discourses, already operating in international settings, for whom ‘lack of progress in 
over 15 years of talks (…) spurred many veteran movement actors to radicalize’. 
Frustration increasingly centred around technocratic, neoliberal UNFCCC processes, 
especially the Kyoto Protocol’s market mechanisms, and ‘the stark juxtaposition of the 
“democratic, consensus-based United Nations” image with (…) backroom deals’.32 
‘Insider-outsider networks’ gradually built climate justice’s ‘epistemic community’,33 
linking North and South.34 For example, the UN Human Development Report 2007/8 on 
climate change was written by a former Oxfam director, highlighting ‘equity and human 
rights’.35 Certain states, particularly low-lying islands, championed rights approaches 
with support from (Northern-led) organisations, securing an Office of the High 
Commissioner report and Human Rights Council resolutions.36 Additional impetus came 
from the labour movement, particularly Just Transition narratives. Increasing pressure 
to find a post-Kyoto agreement saw these dialectical trends converge under UNFCCC 
processes started by the 2007 Bali Road Map (designed to secure a new binding 
agreement), which lasted until the 2011 Durban COP. 
While the spillover with global justice activists promoted comparatively disruptive 
protest,37 many elite NGOs accepted ‘restrictions on their behavior in exchange for 
opportunities for influence’. 38  The Climate Action Network’s (CAN) ‘hierarchical, 
reformist (…) “first generation advocacy”, privileging Northern NGOs, led to dissident 
                                                        
31 Jennifer Hadden, ‘Explaining Variation in Transnational Climate Change Activism: The Role of Inter-
Movement Spillover’ (2014) 14(2) Global Environmental Politics 7, 9. 
32 Ruth Reitan and Shannon Gibson, ‘Climate Change or Social Change? Environmental and Leftist Praxis 
and Participatory Action Research’ (2012) 9(3) Globalizations 395, 399. 
33 J Timmons Roberts and Bradley C Parks, ‘Ecologically Unequal Exchange, Ecological Debt, and Climate 
Justice: The History and Implications of Three Related Ideas for a New Social Movement’ (2009) 50(3-4) 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology 385, 397. 
34 ibid 394-395. 
35 ibid 397. 
36 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Report of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship between Climate Change and Human Rights’ (2009) 
UN Doc A/HRC/10/61. 
37 ibid 16. 
38 ibid 20. 
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members launching Climate Justice Now! (CJN). CAN and CJN competed and cooperated 
around the pivotal 2009 Copenhagen COP, with overlapping membership,39 while a 
more radical group, Climate Justice Action (CJA) formed around (largely European) 
direct action networks.40 Unequal movement actors thus exploited multiple scales and 
varying access to international institutional spaces using different normative and 
institutional groundings.  
Given growing international agitation and raised expectations, failure to secure 
agreements at Copenhagen began a shift in scale and social fields for many movement 
actors. Demonstrating that states themselves are non-unitary actors within uneven 
inter-state relations, certain Latin American states organised alternative spaces, chiefly 
the 2010 Cochabamba World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of 
Mother Earth (CMPCC), attended by thousands of state and movement representatives. 
Latin American climate justice vernacularisation invoked indigenous norms as part of 
growing recognition of legal pluralism in constitutional reform.41 These alternative fora 
became sites for contention. Feminists criticised promotion of supposedly indigenous 
concepts like buen vivir [‘living well’] — which stresses ‘human rights and democracy’ 
through ‘ancestral communitarian natural law’42 — for essentialising ‘male/female 
complementarity’,43 themselves mobilising international human rights standards.44 Thus, 
the same legal norms were employed differently by actors in the same discursive spaces. 
Indeed, not only were legal norms like rights pluralised, but plural norms were legalised, 
with cooption possible in either direction. The CMPCC Peoples’ Agreement ‘infused’ 
indigenous norms into international discourses.45 As Fabricant suggests, this can 
obscure their ‘territoriality and materiality’,46 leaving them open to being ‘commoditized, 
and refashioned’47 to serve hegemonic interests. Subsequently, parts of the Peoples’ 
Agreement were included ‘in brackets’ in negotiating texts for the 2010 Cancun COP, 
including indigenous and ‘Mother Earth’s’ rights. None of these were adopted but gave 
the impression climate justice was taken seriously in statist procedures. Bolivia and 
Ecuador’s own pursuit of neoliberal resource extraction contradicted their climate 
justice rhetoric; Cochrane suggests this warns against reifying indigeneity or ‘displacing 
class oppression with notions of cultural diversity’,48 demonstrating how legal pluralism 
cannot disregard political economy. 
                                                        
39 Reitan and Gibson (n 32) 398. 
39 ibid 403. 
40 ibid 404. 
41 Regina Cochrane, ‘Climate Change, Buen Vivir, and the Dialectic of Enlightenment: Toward a Feminist 
Critical Philosophy of Climate Justice’ (2014) 29(3) Hypatia 576, 578. 
42 ibid 581. 
43 ibid 586. 
44 ibid 588. 
45 Nicole Fabricant, ‘Good Living for Whom? Bolivia’s Climate Justice Movement and the Limitations of 
Indigenous Cosmovisions’ (2013) 8(2) Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies 159, 169. 
46 ibid 170. 
47 ibid 173. 
48 Cochrane (n 41) 593. 
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 Cancun thus represented ‘an almost total reinscription and subsumption of this “other” 
discourse’ of climate justice. This was a turning point for many climate justice advocates 
frustrated again in their international engagement .49 The 2011 Durban COP’s results 
were described by some as ‘tantamount to genocide’.50 Still, Durban witnessed a 
concerted strategy by several states, increasing ‘youth activism’, and an ‘occupation’ by 
civil society groups, which ‘injected a new dynamic’ into climate justice and secured 
more radical targets, some non-market mechanisms and increased adaptation finance. A 
turn to more multilevel approaches to climate justice was encapsulated by a Bolivian 
negotiator, who stated ‘the key thing is not inside the COP’, but ‘strong organization from 
social movements (...) around the whole world’.51  
3.3. Multi-sited Climate Justice and Rights 
From a legal pluralist perspective, simultaneous influx of normative orders (including 
movement spillover) and institutional openings in the global climate discursive space 
saw vernacular frames globalised and global frames, including UNFCCC legal norms, 
vernacularised, as well as crossovers between global frames (especially through human 
rights). However, the shortcomings of these institutional openings and global frames 
encouraged a strategic switch away from the global scale, albeit with altered, hybrid 
frames merging ‘local’ and ‘global’. This decentralisation and hybridisation expanded 
issues, scales and actors involved in climate justice. For example, ‘just sustainability’ 
movements, like ‘transition towns’, seek ‘to transform both dominating and 
unsustainable practices of production and consumption’ and ‘rebuild the material 
relationships we have with (…) resources we use’.52 This ‘pushes beyond the qualifiers 
“environment” or “climate” (…) understanding that justice itself depends on a stable and 
predictable set of environmental conditions’.53 
Rights interpretations have played a role in the emergence of multi-sited climate justice. 
In Derman’s analysis of civil society COP discourses, ‘uneven responsibilities, 
vulnerabilities, and impacts’ are strategically linked ‘to rights language as mobilized in 
legal doctrine’. Rights assist in disaggregating the UNFCCC’s statist principles ‘from the 
national scale to (…) individuals and communities’, seeking ‘increased recognition and 
representation of marginalized stakeholders’.54 Thus, for Skillington, ‘hybrid’ climate 
justice coalitions share a diagnostic ‘frame of exploitation’, linking ecological 
degradation to ‘certain economic actors’, and a prognostic frame advocating ‘expansive 
                                                        
49 Bertie Russell, Andre Pusey and Leon Sealey-Huggins, ‘Movements and Moments for Climate Justice: 
From Copenhagen to Cancun via Cochabamba’ (2012) 11(1) ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical 
Geographies 15, 30. 
50 John Foran and Richard Widick, ‘Breaking Barriers to Climate Justice’ (2013) 12(2) Contexts 34, 36. 
51 ibid 38. 
52 Schlosberg (n 19) 49. 
53 ibid 48. 
54 Brandon B Derman, ‘Climate Governance, Justice, and Transnational Civil Society’ (2014) 14(1) Climate 
Policy 23, 33-34. 
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politics of sustainable development’, where private exploitation of commons is seen as a 
rights violation,55 implying special compensatory rights.56  
However, given different rights interpretations compete across social fields within 
uneven hegemonic processes, cooption of climate justice through rights to bolster statist 
interests is also evident. Human rights’ ongoing tension is that they, too, are state-based 
law, despite the transcendent prefix ‘human’; indeed, as much as they disaggregate sub-
nationally, they bear imprints of historical struggles from particular contexts. Grear 
suggests rights are ‘intrinsically ill equipped to prevent (…) violations justified in the 
name of “national interest”’ — and, given ‘national interest is increasingly defined by (…) 
neoliberalism’, rights are ‘even more vulnerable’ because they ‘are already colonized’ by 
neoliberalism, meaning ‘climate justice already contains (…) the juridical receptors for 
corporate viral capture’.57 Skillington’s discourse analysis finds hegemonic climate 
discourses easily reframe rights around ‘the “preeminent right” of states to exploit 
dwindling resources’.58 This paradox is appreciated in legal pluralism by Merry — rights 
inspire movements for social change but, often, ‘to be part of the human rights system 
(…) [actors or movements ]must emphasize (…) a modernist view of the individual and 
society embedded in the global North (…) along with democracy, the rule of law, 
capitalism and the free market’.59 This sounds caution about what Grear calls a ‘strong 
rule of law’ climate justice approach because climate injustice ‘is a manifestation of a 
structural pathology in which law itself is central’.60 Grear suggests going ‘beyond seeing 
climate injustice as a symptom of climate change (as if simply “caused by” it)’, and 
instead acknowledging ‘systemic structural conditions’ of ‘liberal legal subjectivity’ and 
global inequality.61  
Doing so overcomes what Fisher (no relation) calls the ‘global trap’ — assuming the 
international is ‘the space for the best access to climate justice’, despite climate change 
being ‘mediated through multiple local problems’62 — a familiar issue in rights and legal 
pluralism, and a dilemma for ‘translators’ who, echoing Merry, vernacularise 
transnational climate justice through seeking resonant frames.63 Translators ‘claim their 
own space’ in climate debates but often ‘claimed’ spaces simply ‘feed into the UNFCCC’. 64 
As with the CMPCC, particular injustices can be ‘redefined as part of wider national 
injustices’ to ‘match with (…) global [statist] discourses’.65 Fisher demonstrates how 
                                                        
55 Tracey Skillington, ‘Climate Change and the Human Rights Challenge: Extending Justice Beyond the 
Borders of the Nation State’ (2012) 16(8) The International Journal of Human Rights 1196, 1199. 
56 ibid 1200. 
57 Anna Grear, ‘Towards ‘Climate Justice’? A Critical Reflection on Legal Subjectivity and Climate Injustice: 
Warning Signals, Patterned Hierarchies, Directions for Future Law and Policy’ (2014) 5(special issue) 
Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 103, 122. 
58 Skillington (n 55) 1200. 
59 Merry (n 10) 228. 
60 Grear (n 57) 106. 
61 ibid 118. 
62 Fisher (n 18) 76. 
63 Merry (n 10) 
64 ibid 79. 
65 ibid. 
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Indian climate justice movements struggle to situate arguments about intra-state 
distribution against the government’s ‘climate nationalism’,66 framing statist historical 
responsibility and national average per capita emissions. Greenpeace India endorsed a 
disaggregated rights-based framework, Greenhouse Development Rights (GDRs), but 
abandoned this as it failed to resonate.67 Echoing Grear, Fisher suggests climate justice 
must go beyond the ‘global’ ‘to explore the distribution, recognition and participation of 
different actors across different spaces’, rather than seeing climate injustices as 
‘additional’ to existing structural inequalities. Otherwise, hegemonic discourses of 
domestic transition can repackage ‘climate justice as the resilience of existing social 
systems rather than the transformation to new more equal societies’.68 For rights and 
related discourses, then, possibilities for cooption in unequal, multiscalar hegemonic 
processes around climate justice are acute.  
3.4. Climate Justice, Rights and Legal Pluralism 
To assist in analysing particular contexts, climate justice aspects that compete within 
these discursive spaces are identified as responsibilities, rights, distributions, procedures 
and recognition, where recognition is a dimension in which injustices are linked to 
‘cultural or symbolic injustices’.69 Bulkeley et al conceive of these within a pyramid, 
rather than a two-dimensional ‘plane’ as in statist iterations, ‘where distributions, 
procedures, rights and responsibilities form the four triangular faces, and recognition (…) 
the square bottom’; consequently, ‘each facet (…) is bound to’ and ‘filtered through the 
others, refracting and reconfiguring what (…) justice entails in any one context:’70 
Fig 1. Pyramid of Responsibilities, Rights, Distributions, Procedures and Recognition 
 
 
 
                                                        
66 ibid 77. 
67 ibid 76. 
68 ibid 80. 
69 H Bulkeley et al, ‘Contesting Climate Justice in the City’ (2014) 25 Global Environmental Change 31, 33. 
70 ibid 34. 
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We might add a fourth dimension — time — and recognise both diagnostic and 
prognostic frames. Furthermore, we might think of parallel dimensions, with the 
pyramid in competition with the statist two-dimensional plane in hegemonic processes. 
This provides a heuristic for examining climate justice from legal pluralist and rights 
perspectives: various symbolic frames (recognition) are used to vernacularise climate 
justice norms (rights, responsibilities, distributions and procedures) by actors in social 
fields at different scales (the pyramid’s three-dimensional space). Discourses and 
narratives that emerge, contesting hegemonic discourses across the two-dimensional 
statist plane, operate at different spaces within the pyramid dependent on which aspects 
they relate to or combine with in different contexts; at different heights depending on 
how they are translated at different scales; and emerging at different times depending 
on historical struggles. Thus, climate justice began by engaging with inter-state and 
international climate discourses on rights, responsibilities, distributions and procedures 
through more disaggregated strategies, using recognition to highlight climate injustices; 
this spatially global and temporally diagnostic frame has gradually deepened within the 
pyramid by further discourses of recognition and expanded with scales shifting more to 
the particular level, while temporal perspectives have unfolded towards more 
transformative, prognostic visions of transition and social change. Rights have played a 
role in this spatial deepening, scalar expansion and temporal unfolding. 
 
4. Norwegian Climate Justice Discourses 
4.1. Hegemonic Climate Discourses 
I now turn to actors within Norwegian social fields71 that vernacularise climate justice at 
various scales, and within Norway’s historical and politico-economic context. The 
following observations are based on the author’s participation in climate discourses72 
and a review of publicly-available sources evidencing how Norwegian actors frame 
climate justice. 
‘Climate justice’ as a Norwegian term [klimarettferdighet] became entrenched during the 
second wave, characterised by movement spillover, initially between environmental, 
development and church organisations. Church groups were particularly active 
translators — including development NGO Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), and the state 
church and Christian Council of Norway’s environmental initiative, ‘The Work of 
Creation and Sustainability’ [Skaperverk og Bærekraft], which produces 
Klimarettferdighet magazine. 
                                                        
71 The other side of the dialectical coin — the role of Norwegian actors and norms in influencing climate 
justice’s development on a global scale — is beyond the scope of this study. 
72 I have interned at Framtiden i Våre Hender (FIVH) [Future in Our Hands], and participated actively in 
the Norwegian Civil Service Union and Broen til framtiden [Bridge to the Future] (discussed later). 
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Klimarettferdighet, like climate justice, has gradually expanded, beginning with 
international statist discourses during the ‘second wave’, before turning to more 
transformative, localised transition discourses post-Durban. As legal pluralism suggests, 
frame choices were partly inspired by institutional openings provided in the dominant 
state framing (the two-dimensional plane). Indeed, a central moment of the second wave 
globally was the then Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg’s announcement of 
what were considered the world’s most ambitious carbon cuts in 2007.73 Ytterstad 
illustrates how this originally met little criticism within Norway, especially regarding 
prioritisation of buying tradable credits in other countries over domestic cuts and 
without discussion of Norway’s petroleum industry,74 suggesting a ‘radicalism at an 
impasse’ with ‘no climate policy from below’; partly, this is because potential critics 
were Socialist Left Party members that had to balance criticism with their party’s 
position in the governing coalition, while others lacked concrete alternatives.75 Put 
differently, climate justice proponents carefully negotiated their government’s high-
profile climate agenda (or climate nationalism) with increasing frustration over 
insufficient progress. Like on the global scene, then, climate justice in Norway emerged 
as an alternative, building on pre-existing themes, as a way out of this ‘impasse’. 
Tracing the emergence of klimarettferdighet therefore requires acknowledgement of the 
central contradiction in Norwegian hegemonic discourses: Norway promotes itself 
within international climate discourses, while maintaining its position among leading 
petroleum exporters. This encourages an international, statist frame that deflects 
attention from the national level. Navigating this climate nationalism has been the 
overriding challenge for translating climate justice. 
Three themes have supported this international, statist frame: promotion of inter-state 
emissions trading; financing of high-profile climate initiatives in Southern states, and 
pursuit of technologies, like carbon capture and storage (CCS), that prolong carbon-
intensive industries and avoid ‘carbon leakage’. As linguistic analysis of 2012’s 
government climate change white paper suggests, hegemonic narratives emphasise 
‘international agreement (…) as the only satisfactory way to tackle climate change’,76 
with the Norwegian government as ‘hero’ despite the general ‘villains’ label for 
industrialised countries.77 This climate policy exceptionalism has solid normative roots; 
Norgaard’s ethnographic research in the early 2000s in one rural community found, 
rather than insufficient scientific knowledge, a ‘socially organized process’ of ‘denial’ 
                                                        
73 Andreas Ytterstad, ‘“It is We —  You and Me, Who Possess Real Power”: Blogging Protests against 
Official Norwegian Policy on Climate Change’ (2008) 17(3) Intercultural Communication Studies 77. 
74 ibid 85. 
75 ibid 88. 
76 Kjersti Fløttum and Tonje J Espeland, ‘Norske Klimanarrativer: Hvor Mange “Fortellinger”? En 
Lingvistisk og Diskursiv Analyse av to Norske Stortingsmeldinger’ [‘Norwegian Climate Narratives: How 
Many “Stories”? A Linguistic and Discursive Analysis of Two Norwegian White Papers’] (2014) 6(4) 
Sakprosa 1, 9. 
77 ibid 7. 
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caused climate inaction;78 alongside norms stressing tradition and local patriotism, 
‘social narratives, some produced by (…) government, to deflect responsibility for and 
legitimate Norwegian climate and petroleum policy’, including egalitarianist and eco-
friendly narratives were constructed. 79  Temporally, Fløttum and Espeland find 
‘responsibility is left to the future and said to presuppose international cooperation’; as 
such, ‘the direct relation between Norwegian climate initiatives and effects is 
concealed’.80 This diagnostic frame thus postpones implications for Norwegian political 
economy.81 Indeed, another white paper on the Arctic frames climate change as an 
opportunity opening new (petroleum-related) economic possibilities. 82  The 
contradiction between addressing climate change and developing petroleum is captured 
by former Prime Minister Stoltenberg, who said ‘the goal is not to keep the carbon in the 
ground’ but ‘to reduce emissions to the atmosphere’. Representatives of the new 
government have even described use of petroleum-generated wealth to finance climate 
measures as ‘a paradox that we actually should be proud of’.83 As Norgaard concludes, 
‘denial of (…) climate change serves to maintain Norwegian global economic interests 
and perpetuate global environmental injustice’.84 This provides the politico-economic 
context for examining legal pluralism, rights and klimarettferdighet. 
Using the two-dimensional plane to understand dominant statist discourses, firstly, 
promoting emissions trading as the goal of international negotiations minimises 
Norway’s responsibility given its relative size globally, emphasising global emissions 
and thus global emissions reductions financed by Norway in other countries, but 
simultaneously obscuring global impacts of Norwegian petroleum exports. Distributions 
are downplayed, hiding Norway’s historically disproportionate contribution, with 
formal, inter-state procedures prioritised and rights understood as states’ rights to emit; 
thus, recognition of responsibility for climate harms is clouded, with discussion purely at 
aggregated state level. Norgaard found evidence of this in communities’ denial of 
responsibility through the phrase ‘Norge er et lite land’ [‘Norway is a small country’], 
especially as international legal discourses move beyond the Kyoto Protocol’s national 
targets applying only to ‘developed’ states.85 The Kyoto Protocol itself assisted this by 
allowing emissions reductions to be financed by ‘developed’ states overseas to meet 
their targets; this financing was to be ‘supplemental’ to domestic reductions,86 but 
Norway and others interpreted this legal anchoring liberally to (re)establish a global 
frame for post-Kyoto discussions.  
                                                        
78 Karie Marie Norgaard, ‘“We Don’t Really Want to Know”: Environmental Justice and Socially Organized 
Denial of Global Warming in Norway’ (2006) 19(3) Organization and Environment 347, 352. 
79 ibid 358. 
80 Fløttum and Espeland (n 76) 10. 
81 ibid 11. 
82 ibid 15. 
83 ibid 16. 
84 Norgaard (n 78) 365. 
85 ibid 358. 
86 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (entered into force 16 
February 2005) UN Treaty Series vol 2303, Art 6(1)(d).  
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This is confirmed in Norway’s COP activity. Lahn, a former civil society member of 
Norway’s negotiation team, documents how Norway positioned itself centrally in 
‘second wave’ COPs through ‘the Norwegian proposal’ to give states rights to emit 
greenhouse gases. Rather than being allocated for free, a percentage of emissions 
permits would be auctioned. High-emission states would have to buy extra permits from 
those who did not use their permits and via auction through the UN, generating revenue 
for the UN for Southern climate initiatives. 87  As Lahn suggests, by presenting 
negotiations as a means to share ‘the right to use [atmospheric] commons’ through 
commodification without attaching distributive principles,88 the proposal, although 
eventually rejected, contributed to financialising climate talks without accepting ‘this 
enormous economic redistribution must happen in a just way’.89 Crucially, the proposal 
implied emissions rights ‘do not need to have any connection with how large countries’ 
emissions actually are;’ rather, permits would be set internationally and traded globally. 
Thus, ‘responsibility (…) is moved from the local and national level to (…) closed 
meeting rooms in international negotiations’, implying nothing is left if these 
negotiations fail90 — the ‘global trap’ outlined previously — and meaning Stoltenberg’s 
high-profile pledge (already caveated with ‘if it contributes to an international 
agreement’) was never intended to be taken domestically.91  
Secondly, financing climate initiatives in the South, especially rainforest-related, further 
deflects attention from Norwegian responsibility with inter-state, global framings, while 
securing Norway’s position as a leading climate actor. It provides, nonetheless, limited 
recognition of inter-state distribution. Consequently, klimarettferdighet translators must 
carefully walk the line between criticism and cooption; the initiatives are both praised as 
evidence ‘politicians are important driving forces (…) for climate justice’92  and 
increasingly subject to scrutiny of their effectiveness.93 
Thirdly, unlike the first two more diagnostic themes, CCS and carbon leakage are more 
prognostic, presenting Norwegian petroleum as the solution to international challenges: 
it is portrayed as ‘cleaner’ than international competitors, therefore preferable for 
addressing Southern energy poverty, and Norwegian gas is a ‘bridge’ between coal and 
renewables (arguments documented by Norgaard94 already in the early 2000s). As 
Fløttum and Espeland note, this narrative ‘invites an ethical evaluation’ but ‘does not 
                                                        
87 Bård Lahn, Klimaspillet: En Fortelling fra Innsiden av FNs Klimatoppmøter [The Climate Game: A Story 
from the Inside of UN’s Climate Summits](Flamme 2013) 47-51. 
88 ibid 68. 
89 ibid 194. 
90 ibid 252-253. 
91 ibid 112-115. 
92Arild Hermstad, ‘Norge Best?’ [‘Is Norway Best?’] (Framtiden i Våre Hender [Future in Our Hands], 2 
November 2011) <http://www.framtiden.no/201111025344/blogg/arilds-blogg/norge-best.html>.  
93 Geir Salvesen and Siri Gedde-Dahl, ‘Norsk Klimaprosjekt i Hardt Vær’ [‘Norwegian Climate Project in 
Rough Weather’] Aftenposten (Oslo, 30 December 2011) <http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/ 
Norsk-klimaprosjekt-i-hardt-vr-6730543.html#.UZEn_8r4KSp>. 
94 Norgaard (n 78) 358. 
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take up the ethical implications (…) connected to petroleum export’. 95  Again, 
international climate law features here; such claims are ‘justified by switching the focus 
from national targets and measures (…) to emphasizing climate change as an 
international problem’,96 inviting comparisons between Norwegian petroleum and other 
energy sources. Norwegian responsibility is further diminished — indeed, practically 
absolved — while giving limited recognition to inter-state distributions by invoking 
energy poverty. Thus, this narrative hints at transition (primarily through CCS) without 
changing course. This is accompanied by the suggestion unilateral transition will not 
only hurt Norwegians (through job and economic losses), but have limited or adverse 
effects, given ‘carbon leakage’, whereby industries leave Norway for ‘developing’ states 
where environmental standards are lower — yet again supporting an international, 
statist framing. Norgaard links this to popular arguments emphasising Norwegian’s past 
poverty.97  
In summary, hegemonic Norwegian climate narratives are dominated by statist, 
international frames that deflect responsibility, but adopt aspects of justice frames by 
implying Norwegian petroleum can solve climate and developmental crises. This 
includes coopting rights in emissions rights and the defence of Norwegians’ rights 
implied by carbon leakage. These narratives, reflecting the political economy of an oil-
dependent state, are carefully woven into existing norms in social fields. The following 
outlines how, in the context of these hegemonic processes, klimarettferdighet 
vernacularises climate justice in countering statist, diagnostic narratives, before 
examining development of more prognostic frames focused on domestic transition in 
line with Norwegian norms and political economy. 
4.2. Counter-hegemonic Responses 
Like climate justice discourses generally, klimarettferdighet framed itself first and 
foremost in global, statist terms to critique hegemonic statist framing, amplifying and 
disaggregating responsibility to focus on Norway, and using recognition of individual and 
collective injustice to stress procedures, distribution and rights beyond states. This 
involves several frames.  
Firstly, responsibility is expanded to acknowledge historical responsibility. Already in 
1996, a Church synod declaration, ‘Consumption and Justice’, stated Norway has 
‘through its oil extraction, transport policies and reduction of research on alternative 
energy sources failed its global responsibilities’. 98 Both Friends of the Earth Norway 
[Naturvernforbundet] 99 and leading NGO Future in Our Hands [Framtiden i våre hender] 
                                                        
95 Fløttum and Espeland (n 76) 8. 
96 Norgaard (n 78) 360. 
97 ibid 358. 
98 ‘Forbruk og Rettferd’ [Consumption and Justice] (KM10/96, Kirkemøtet [Church synod declaration], 
1996). 
99 ‘Klimarettferdighet’ [Climate Justice] (Naturvernforbundet, 27 October 2015) 
 <http://naturvernforbundet.no/klima/internasjonalt/global-klimarettferdighet/category2911.html>. 
Aled Dilwyn Fisher - Legal Pluralism and Human Rights in the Idea of Climate Justice 
   
215 
(FIVH), frame their websites on international climate politics under klimarettferdighet, 
linking to UNFCCC principles. FIVH argue historical responsibility ‘should form the basis 
of Norway’s climate policy’, 100 demanding binding agreements with ‘massive transfers 
from rich to poor’ to repay ‘climate debt’, and ‘just distribution of emissions rights’ to 
allow increased emissions from historically ‘underdeveloped’ states.101  
Secondly, intergenerational justice has increasingly extended klimarettferdighet’s 
temporal reach to stress recognition of rights of and distribution to future generations, 
evidenced by the ‘Grandparents’ Climate Campaign’. New legal and rights-based 
narratives referencing the constitutional right to an environment guaranteed for 
‘descendants’ are increasingly prevalent.102 Appeal to (non-climate) national law has 
thus also featured among movement strategies in vernacularising transnational climate 
justice. 
Thirdly, statist interpretations of procedures, distribution and responsibilities have been 
disaggregated through recognition of Southern actors beyond inter-state financing. This 
involves social movement spillover with development and global justice campaigns. 
Klimarettferdighet arose around the Bali Road Map through the ‘Climate Seen from the 
South’ campaign by FIVH, the Rainforest Foundation, WWF, Naturvernforbundet, and the 
Development Fund Norway, which commissioned a climate policy review from Southern 
activists ‘from a climate justice perspective’,103 Southern recognition was central to COP 
mobilisations: campaigners demonstrated for klimarettferdighet in Oslo in 2009 
alongside Global Migrants for Climate Action.104  
Fourthly, distribution, rights and responsibility are often visualised through a global 
carbon budget — the remaining carbon that can be emitted while avoiding serious 
climate change. The Norwegian foreword to Naturvernforbundet’s 2011 report 
Klimagambling (translated from Friends of the Earth UK) suggests ‘rich states, based on 
all reasonable evaluations of justice, must leave as much as possible of their carbon 
budget to (…) the South’, necessitating ‘even greater’ emissions reductions in Norway.105 
Through recognition, carbon budgeting thus links leaving Norwegian petroleum reserves 
untouched to let Southern states exploit theirs.  
                                                        
100 Gunnell Sandanger, ‘Krever klimarettferdighet’ [Demanding Climate Justice] (FIVH, 1 November 2010)  
<http://www.framtiden.no/201011013032/aktuelt/klima/krever-klimarettferdighet.html>. 
101 ‘Klima’ (FIVH, undated) <http://www.framtiden.no/aktuelt/klima/>. 
102 Pål W Lorentzen, ‘Slutt å Leke Klimapolitikk, Erna Solberg!’ [Stop Playing Climate Politics, Erna 
Solberg!] Bergens Tidende (Bergen, 19 November 2014)  
<http://www.bt.no/meninger/kronikk/Slutt-a-leke-klimapolitikk_-Erna-Solberg-3243343.html>. 
103 Guri Tajet, ‘Luksuriøs Norsk Livsstil’ [Luxurious Norwegian Lifestyle] (FIVH, 15 December 2008) 
<http://www.framtiden.no/200812152462/rapporter/klima/luksurios-norsk-livsstil.html>. 
104 Anne-Merethe Pedersen, ‘Gateteater mot CO2’ [Street Theatre Against CO2] (Naturvernforbundet, 1 
September 2009) <http://naturvernforbundet.no/nyheter/gateteater-mot-co2-article8867-166.html> 
105 ‘Klimagambling: Om Hvordan Politisk Ansvarsfraskrivelse Øker Faren for Alvorlige Klimaendringer’ 
[Climate Gambling: How Political Abdication of Responsibility Increases the Risk for Serious Climate 
Change] (Naturvernforbundet, 2 October 2011, Report (no. 2)) 7 
<http://naturvernforbundet.no/getfile.php/Dokumenter/Rapporter%20og%20faktaark/2011/klimagam
bling-rapport.pdf>. 
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Rights have featured prominently in these framings through GDRs, which combine 
historical responsibility, recognition of Southern development concerns and domestic 
action within a global carbon budget. Tom Athanasiou, GDRs’ developer, appeared at 
Naturvernforbundet’s 2012 conference ‘Climate Justice: Climate Politics is the Politics of 
Wealth Distribution’. Naturvernforbundet used GDRs to endorse disaggregated 
alternatives to UNFCCC statist ‘developed’-‘developing’ binaries. 106  Rights-based 
development organisation NCA, a central climate justice translator since 2007,107 have 
championed GDRs since 2008.108 Their 2014 primarily English report, Norway’s Fair 
Share of an Ambitious Climate Effort, argues, under GDRs’ ‘Responsibility and Capacity 
Index’, Norway should contribute to global reductions corresponding to 300 percent of 
1990 domestic emissions by 2020 — far higher than official targets. The (Norwegian) 
foreword links historical responsibility to oil, stressing Norway must finance Southern 
initiatives and domestic cuts. GDRs are anchored in UNFCCC’s CBDR principle.109  
Thus, climate justice has been vernacularised in frames of historical responsibility, 
intergenerational justice, recognition of Southern actors and carbon budgets to 
disaggregate diagnostic statist narratives. While these translate more-or-less directly 
from transnational discourses, including operationalising UNFCCC principles, they 
merge with existing normative and institutional contexts in two ways. Firstly, they 
acknowledge (through expanding responsibility) Norwegian petroleum’s global 
contribution — a long-standing concern for klimarettferdighet actors, especially the 
church and environmentalists, as seen in FIVH’s 2010 klimarettferdighet campaign that 
stresses Norway must ‘quickly leave the oil age’, countering arguments that ‘poor 
countries need energy’ and about ‘clean’ extraction, and linking this to Statoil’s overseas 
tarsands investments.110 While assumptions of ‘eco-friendly Norway’ found by Norgaard 
bolster exceptionalist arguments for Norwegian petroleum, and many Norwegians 
appreciate petroleum’s contribution to their welfare, challenging petroleum’s hegemony 
is increasingly resonant not only with environmental norms but growing recognition of 
adverse economic effects of ‘oil dependence’ in raising prices and monopolising certain 
                                                        
106  Ola Skaalvik Elvevold, ‘Klimarettferdighet på Dagsorden’ [‘Climate Justice on the Agenda’] 
(Naturvernforbundet [Friends of the Earth Norway], 19 October 2012) 
<http://naturvernforbundet.no/klima/internasjonalt/global-klimarettferdighet/klimarettferdighet-paa-
dagsorden-article27849-2911.html>.  
107 Kirkens Nødhjelp [Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)] and Church of Sweden, ‘Climate Change Threatens 
the Fight against Poverty’, (2007) 1 Understanding the Issue 
<https://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/contentassets/c1403acd5da84d39a120090004899173/2008/ 
climate-change.pdf>.  
108 ‘Norges Klimaregning: Hvordan Norge kan Bidra til en Rettferdig, Effektiv og Utviklingsvennlig 
Klimaavtale’ [Norway’s Climate Dues: How Norway Could Contribute to a Just, Efficient and Development 
Friendly Climate Agreement] (Kirkens Nødhjelp, [Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)], September 2008)  
<https://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/contentassets/c1403acd5da84d39a120090004899173/2008/ 
trykkversjon_rapport_kn_gdr_sept08.pdf>. 
109 Stockholm Environmental Institute, ‘Norway’s Fair Share of an Ambitious Climate Effort’ (NCA, 2014) 
<https://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Climate/ 
SEI-KN-2014-Norways-fair-share.pdf>. 
110 Gunnell Sandanger, ‘Krever klimarettferdighet’ [Demanding Climate Justice] (FIVH, 1 November 2010)  
<http://www.framtiden.no/201011013032/aktuelt/klima/krever-klimarettferdighet.html>. 
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skills.111 Secondly, solidarist norms (vital to development organisations and the church) 
are projected onto the inter-state and inter-temporal level, using recognition to 
emphasise disaggregated distribution, procedures and rights. This includes use of the 
folk concept of dugnad (collective work community members are expected to participate 
in). Naturvernforbundet refer to a ‘climate dugnad’, the share of which must be higher for 
developed countries.112 As noted, these are among norms Norgaard identifies that are 
co-opted in hegemonic discourses to justify Norway’s high profile in climate 
negotiations and continued promotion of petroleum as ‘solution’. Industry lobbyists 
invoke ‘solidarity’ to defend petroleum. Nonetheless, klimarettferdighet actors 
increasingly counter this, an NCA, FIVH and Statistics Norway report showed reducing 
petroleum production would have little effect on poverty (as little is exported to the 
poorest nations).113 Through exploiting institutional openings provided by statist, 
international narratives in hegemonic discourses that protect petroleum interests, 
klimarettferdighet increasingly employs more multi-scalar and multi-temporal frames. 
While countering statist diagnoses, they imply a more prognostic, proactive focus on 
Norway’s responsibilities, promoting a turn from the global towards domestic transition. 
4.3. Turning Klimarettferdighet Inward 
This has sparked debate on how climate justice, especially distributions, rights and 
procedures, manifests itself within Norway, invoking norms of civil society involvement 
in socioeconomic transitions and social democratic norms, including tripartite 
cooperation.114 Like transnational narratives, this turn began in earnest after Durban. 
For Copenhagen, NCA and FIVH organised an activist conference at Oslo Opera House, 
taking 1,200 activists by boat to Copenhagen, where Norwegian signatures on a global 
climate justice petition were given to the Environment Minister.115  For Cancun, 
numerous organisations organised a parallel conference in Oslo, addressed by the leader 
of the Confederation of Trade Unions — demonstrating increasing movement 
spillover.116 Thereafter, previously-described convergence of frustration with COPs and 
revitalised multi-scalar struggles at Durban shifted strategic scale to domestic levels; a 
post-Durban article by Ytterstad, referencing Norwegian participation in Durban’s union 
                                                        
111 Marie Melgård De Rosa and Mathias Vedeler, ‘Ulltveit-Moe Advarer Mot Oljeavhengigheten’ [Ulltveit-
Moe Warns Against Oil Dependency] Stavanger Aftenblad (Stavanger, 24 August 2013) 
 <http://www.aftenbladet.no/energi/olje/Ulltveit-Moe-advarer-mot-oljeavhengigheten-3238766.html>.  
112 Naturvernforbundet (n 99).  
113 Statistics Norway, Norsk Olje- og Gassproduksjon [Norwegian Oil and Gas Production] (NCA and FIVH, 
2013) 
 <https://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/contentassets/c1403acd5da84d39a120090004899173/norsk-olje-
og-gassproduksjon-rapport-med-layout-final.pdf>. 
114 On the context-specific development, institutionalisation and enduring influence of (Scandinavian) 
social democratic norms: Kristian Stokke and Olle Törnquist, ‘The Relevance of the Scandinavian 
Experiences’ in Kristian Stokke and Olle Törnquist (eds), Democratization in the Global South: The 
Importance of Transformative Politics (Palgrave MacMillan 2013) 21-41. 
115 ‘Changemaker på Klimaseilas’ [Changemaker is Sailing for the Climate] (Changemaker, 2009) 
<http://changemaker.no/changemaker-pa-klimaseilas/>. 
116 ‘KlimaOppmøtet’ (Grønn kirke: Kirkelig Nettverk for Skaperverk og Bærekraft [Christian Network for 
Environment and Justice],  2010) <http://www.gronnkirke.no/index.cfm?id=325326>. 
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‘World of Work’ conference and Friends of the Earth’s ‘One Million Climate Jobs’ launch, 
calls for demoralised environmentalists to join others, especially unions, in ‘the 
movement for climate justice and green jobs’.117 
More future-orientated, disaggregated discourses build on expanded notions of 
Norwegian responsibility in diagnostic frames, giving responsibility collective social 
dimensions deeper within the climate justice pyramid. This connects responsibility to 
individuals’ and organisations’ responsibility through appeal to solidarity, including the 
Church encouraging ‘klimadugnad’ (a climate ‘dugnad’ (grassroots voluntary effort)).118 
Collective mobilising frames build on norms of civil society involvement in policy-
making, including the Church’s active social role based on state establishment and status 
as a democratic, membership organisation. Skaperverk og Bærekraft’s founding 
document, opposing shifting ‘realisation of a sustainable society and global justice (…) to 
the kingdom of heaven’, seeks ‘political and social change’, recognising climate change as 
‘a global question of right and wrong’ and ‘a political question’, including regarding oil. 
As the Church is both ‘central and local’, it ‘has a responsibility (…) to build 
environmental involvement across political divides’, but also be ‘radical, proactive and 
admonishing’. 119  This deepened social responsibility builds on stewardship and 
‘practical’ love in scripture, ‘challenging the powerful’. Indeed, ‘being created in God’s 
image means (…) we have a unique responsibility’. Klimarettferdighet thus ‘challenges us 
both individually and collectively;’ Church members are encouraged to take collective 
action, including using their vote.120 
Emphasising Norwegian responsibility within disaggregated global discourses also 
highlights consumption. Sometimes, this involves sacrificial narratives. Church groups 
have connected responsibility to forsaking, though adding that relinquishing material 
goods ‘can improve (…) quality of life’.121 Similar sentiments are heard from the anti-
consumerist FIVH, suggesting klimarettferdighet implies ‘disadvantages’ for Norwegians 
because it ‘cannot be achieved by the rich becoming richer’.122 By emphasising state-level 
                                                        
117 Andreas Ytterstad, ‘I Stedet for å Vente på den 18. Kuruken’ [Instead of Waiting for the 18th Cowpat] 
Aftenposten (Oslo, 14 December 2011)  
<http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikker/I-stedet-for-a-vente-pa-den-18-kuruken-
6720591.html>. 
118 Knut Refsdal (Secretary General, Norges Kristne Råd [Norway’s Christian Council]), ‘This Is Our 
Mayday!’ (Grønn Kirke: Kirkelig Nettverk for Skaperverk og Bærekraft [Christian Network for Environment 
and Justice], 2014) <http://www.gronnkirke.no/index.cfm?id=420295>.  
119 ‘Bærekraft og Skaperverk. Økumenisk Prosjekt for Endring av Kirke og Samfunn 2007-2017’ 
[‘Sustainability and Creation. Ecumenical Project to Change Church and Society 2007-2017’] (KM5.1/08, 
Kirkemøtet [Church synod declaration], 2008). 
120 ‘Klimarettferdighet: Vern om Skaperverket’ [‘Climate Justice: Protect God’s Work of Creation’] (Den 
Norske Kirke [The Norwegian Church], 2013) 
 <http://kirkeaktuelt.no/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Flyer_klimarettferdighet.pdf>. 
121 ‘Skaperverket - vårt livsgrunnlag, vår glede og vårt ansvar’ [‘The Creation – Our Basis of Existence, Our 
Joy and Our Responsibility’] (uttalelse fra Rådsmøtet i Gran, Norges Kristne Råd [Declaration by Council 
Meeting in Gran, of The Christian Council of Norway], 20 March 2007) 
<http://www.gronnkirke.no/index.cfm?id=238367>. 
122 Arild Hermstad, ‘What’s in it for Me?’ (Framtiden i Våre Hender [Future in Our Hands], 6 December 
2010) 
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responsibility to critique state narratives that diminish responsibility, sacrificial 
narratives can imply all Norwegians are wealthy, ignoring domestic distribution.  
Sacrificial narratives have thus diminished as new, domestic-orientated actors have 
spilled-over into klimarettferdighet movements, particularly unions, who increasingly 
connect international solidarity norms with their members’ self-interest as part of the 
growing focus on socioeconomic transitions from carbon-intensive industries. A 
statement (‘The Climate Struggle — a Struggle for Social Power’) from several leaders 
within the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) declared that climate policy 
‘cannot (…) be reduced to a question of sacrifice (…) of our hard-won rights’, but is 
‘about creating a better society’.123 This reflects debates within LO between some unions 
favouring counter-hegemonic klimarettferdighet to protect existing rights and the 
adoption of hegemonic discourses by LO generally. LO formally supports a ‘just 
transition that emphasises working life, social and work-related rights, decent and green 
jobs in a sustainable low-emissions society’, stressing tripartite cooperation.124 However, 
LO is criticised for supporting petroleum, shifting responsibility to ‘workers in poor 
countries’ and ‘descendants of today’s well-fed Norwegian working-class’.125 In early 
klimarettferdighet narratives, non-LO confederations featured more prominently.126 
LO’s 2014 climate strategy largely reflects hegemonic climate narratives. Petroleum-
related responsibilities are downplayed, echoing arguments around Norwegian gas 
replacing coal and carbon leakage that stress climate initiatives ‘should to the greatest 
possible extent be established within regional and global deals’. Indeed, transitions are 
couched in terms of ‘market advantage’. LO thus links union values of solidarity and 
equality to climate justice frames — that ‘especially poor people are hard hit’, the 
diminishing carbon budget, and historical responsibility127 — but within a politico-
economic analysis that links workers’ interests to continued petroleum production. 
Cooption of climate justice language within hegemonic productivist ‘class compromise[s] 
(…) between organized labor, the state, and capital’ is said to protect existing 
entitlements and avenues of influence, particularly institutionalised social dialogue, and 
therefore ‘the political power of [Northern] unions’ as institutions, instead of global 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 <http://www.framtiden.no/201012063062/blogg/arilds-blogg/whats-in-it-for-me.html>. 
123 Jan Davidsen et al, ‘The Climate Struggle — A Struggle for Social Power’ (For Velferdsstaten [A Broad 
Alliance for the Welfare State], 26 September 2012) 
<http://www.velferdsstaten.no/Tema/Verden/?article_id=96528>.  
124 ‘Klima’ [Climate] (LO, undated) <http://lo.no/politikk/Klima/>. 
125 Arild Hermstad, ‘Musikk i Stoltenbergs Klimaører’ [Music to Stoltenberg’s Climate Ears] (FIVH, 8 June 
2011)  
<http://www.framtiden.no/201106083759/blogg/arilds-blogg/musikk-i-stoltenbergs-klimaorer.html>. 
126 ‘Klima for Endring: Et Informasjons- og Debatthefte fra Norges Naturvernforbund og Unio 2009’ 
[Climate for Change: An Informational and Debate Brochure from Friends of the Earth Norway and Unio] 
 (Naturvernforbundet and Unio, 2009) 
<http://naturvernforbundet.no/getfile.php/Dokumenter/Internasjonalt/ 
HEFTE%20-%20KLIMA%20FOR%20ENDRING%202009.pdf>. 
127 ‘Klimastrategisk Plan’ [Climate Strategy Plan] (LO, 17 June 2014) 
<http://lo.no/politikk/Klima/Artikler-om-klima/LOs-klimastrategi/>. 
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environmental justice.128 A split, replicated in LO, is often seen between unions in 
carbon-intensive sectors and those in others. For legal pluralism, this suggests how 
politico-economic interests promote formalistic use of legal entitlements to promote 
current interests, rather than broader social change. 
However, several LO and non-LO unions are central in initiatives promoting more 
transformative frames. During the 2013 general election, over 100 organisations joined 
Klimavalg 2013 [‘Climate Election 2013’]. One of Klimavalg’s demands was that 
klimarettferdighet ‘be given concrete content’, demanding parties ‘take historical 
responsibility seriously’ and that states like Norway ‘take a lead with emissions cuts at 
home, and contribute financially to (…) adaptation and development of renewable 
energy for fighting poverty’.129 By demanding reduced oil extraction, a focus on 
transport and household energy, and ‘green jobs and new industrial development’, the 
socioeconomic turn towards a ‘transition’ repackages globally-framed responsibility and 
procedures discourses alongside more domestic distribution and rights demands. 130 
One offshoot of Klimavalg is Broen til framtiden [Bridge to the Future], an initiative 
between unions, environmental NGOs, Skaperverk og Bærekraft and Concerned 
Scientists Norway that has produced books on green jobs and slowing oil extraction, and 
a petition (‘Slow down Norwegian oil extraction — 100,000 climate jobs now!’). One 
session of their 2014 conference was a ‘conversation’ on klimarettferdighet, chaired by 
Bård Lahn, involving Lars Haltbrekken (Naturvernforbundet), Ingrid Næss-Holm (NCA) 
and John Leirvaag (leader of the Norwegian Civil Service Union, an LO member). The 
discussion’s premise was that ‘climate struggle is about democratisation of the economy 
and society (…) redistribution between North and South, and (…) generations’, and Lahn 
linked these distributional themes to historical responsibility and carbon budgets. 
Leirvaag stressed Norwegians have undertaken transitions previously by creating 
security around them, ensuring no particular groups suffer disproportionately, through, 
for example, taxation to catalyse change, and focusing on research to create new jobs. He 
stressed LO represents different workers, including in petroleum, and involves them in 
dialogue. Addressing carbon leakage, Leirvaag suggested Norway’s welfare allows it to 
lead, building green jobs, rather than protecting jobs that must disappear eventually. 
Haltbrekken also stressed that it is better a transition starts smoothly than suddenly, 
supporting green jobs. In answering whether there is hope for a just international 
agreement, Næss-Holm stated both bottom-up and top-down strategies were necessary 
by movements, especially unions, to influence states, as inter-faith work 
demonstrates.131  
                                                        
128 James Patrick Nugent, Changing the Climate: Ecoliberalism, Green New Dealism, and the Struggle over 
Green Jobs in Canada (2011) 36(1) Labor Studies Journal 58, 63-64. 
129 ‘Våre krav til Klimapolitikken’ [Our Demands for Climate Politics] (FIVH, 2013)  
<http://www.framtiden.no/klimavalg2013/artikler/vare-krav-til-klimapolitikken.html>. 
130 ibid. 
131 ‘Broen til Framtiden 2014’ (Broen til Framtiden [Bridge to the Future], updated regularly) 
<http://broentilframtiden.com/broentilframtiden2014/>. 
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This discussion demonstrates how klimarettferdighet bases itself in, but broadens, 
hegemonic discourses’ stress on how the transition affects Norwegian rights and 
distributions to combine domestic and global rights and distributions. This thus expands 
on the same social democratic and civic participatory norms stressing workers’ and civil 
society’s involvement in socioeconomic transitions as hegemonic arguments around 
carbon leakage. Initiatives now link klimarettferdighet with broad social change and 
specific industry-related transitions, as Broen til framtiden’s new book (including 
contributions from unions in petroleum-related sectors and an oil worker) shows.132 
Crucially, using social democratic norms of state-led socioeconomic and industrial 
transitions, undertaken with democratic involvement (including tripartite cooperation), 
builds on the model used to create the petroleum industry, a point increasingly made133 to 
resonate with economic arguments against ‘oil dependence’ — thus, it provides a frame 
that is potentially both resonant and historically credible for moving beyond petroleum 
to a more diverse, sustainable economy. The Church has increasingly used this, including 
in oil-dependent regions; the Bishop of Stavanger, home to the petroleum industry, used 
his 2012 new years’ sermon to connect klimarettferdighet to ‘looking critically at new oil 
finds and growth’.134 In subsequent media debates featuring familiar industry counter-
arguments, he linked klimarettferdighet and intergenerational justice to 
acknowledgement that ‘our entire welfare is anchored in’ petroleum.135  
The transformative turn is also seen in local transition groups, including ‘Sustainable 
Life in Landås’, Bergen. The project, framed as research, rejects dichotomies between 
individual or national scales, endorsing working collectively in ‘appropriately’-sized 
local spaces. The long-term goal is making the ecological footprint of ‘the West’ 
sustainable through alliances with local government, community institutions, NGOs, 
church groups and transition towns internationally.136 The group springs partly from 
church networks, but emphasises human rights first in their list of ‘common 
denominators’.137 They seek a ‘third-way in the climate struggle’ based on cultural and 
political gatherings locally, local food production, energy efficiency and transport.138 
Such initiatives vernacularise global narratives of climate justice, sustainable 
                                                        
132 Andreas Ytterstad (ed), Broen til Framtiden (Gyldendal 2015). 
133 Andreas WH Lindvåg, ‘MDG: Se til Oljeindustrien!’ [MDG: Look to the Oil Industry!] Vårt Land (Oslo, 9 
May 2015) <http://www.vl.no/nyhet/mdg-se-til-oljeindustrien-1.356822>. 
134 Erling Pettersen, ‘Biskopens Nyttårstale’ [The Bishop’s New Year’s Speech], Stavanger Aftenblad 
(Stavanger, January 2012) 
 <http://www.aftenbladet.no/incoming/article2916122.ece/BINARY/biskopens.pdf>. 
135 Hilde Øvrebekk Lewis, ‘Biskopen ut mot Oljefylket’ [The Bishop Speaks Out Against the Oil County] 
Stavanger Aftenblad (Stavanger, 9 January 2012)  
<http://www.aftenbladet.no/energi/Biskopen-ut-mot-oljefylket-2916097.html>. 
136 Agnes Vevle Tvinnereim and others, ‘Prosjektbeskrivelse for Bærekraftige liv — et 3-årig Pilotprosjekt 
på Landås’ [Project Description for Sustainable Living — A 3-year Pilot Project in Landås] (Bærekraftig Liv 
[Sustainable Living], 30 October 2009)  
<http://www.barekraftigeliv.no/content/files/prosjektbeskrivelse_Baerliv.pdf>. 
137‘Historikk og Bakgrunn’ [History and Background] (Bærekraftig Liv, undated)  
<http://www.barekraftigeliv.no/omoss/verdigrunnlag>. 
138 Lars Ove Kvalbein, ‘En Tredje Vei i Klimakampen?’ [A Third-way in the Climate Struggle] (Bærekraftig 
Liv, 2011) <http://www.barekraftigeliv.no/omoss/kronikk>. 
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development and human rights, merging with civic participatory and social democratic 
norms to reframe climate change as a threat to both others’ and Norwegians’ welfare.  
In summary, the proactive, prognostic turn in klimarettferdighet vernacularises climate 
justice by stressing recognition of responsibilities, rights, distributions and procedures 
within Norway, building on acknowledgement of petroleum dependence and solidarity 
in diagnostic frames, and augmenting this with civic participation and social democratic 
norms. Individual and collective dimensions of Norwegians’ responsibility, including 
consumption, are addressed. Increased union involvement has encouraged and been 
encouraged by this, furthering the socioeconomic, industrial transition focus. While 
different unions operate differently within hegemonic processes based on politico-
economic interests, new alliances connect diverse actors, and promote green jobs and 
transitions across sectors with tools including law and rights (especially the 
constitutional environmental right and workers’ rights). Crucially, this confronts the 
politico-economic premise of hegemonic narratives by suggesting petroleum 
dependence threatens rights globally and domestically; it also anchors its solution of 
state-led socioeconomic transition with significant civil society involvement and 
tripartite cooperation in norms crucial to the history of the petroleum industry itself.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Legal pluralism empirically examines norms and institutions, including law, in semi-
autonomous socio-ecological fields where actors construct collective action frames, at 
multiple scales, within historically-situated hegemonic processes. Climate justice 
discourses arise from the interaction of lived injustices within particular historical 
struggles and politico-economic contexts, and institutional openings provided by climate 
(and non-climate) law and policy. Countering international, statist frames during 
institutional openings that emerged during the ‘second wave’ of climate interest, climate 
justice is increasingly disaggregated, multi-scalar and prognostic. Discursive elements of 
responsibilities, rights, distributions, and procedures are disaggregated and 
vernacularised using recognition, employing both diagnostic and prognostic themes in 
which rights feature prominently. 
In Norway, klimarettferdighet actors vernacularise transnational climate justice 
discourses, including UNFCCC principles, into resonant frames, using recognition to 
disaggregate statist, globally-scaled discourses around emissions trading, state-financed 
initiatives and carbon leakage, and increasingly turn climate justice inward to more 
future-orientated questions of domestic transition. Movements used institutional 
openings to counter hegemonic narratives by emphasising disaggregated responsibility, 
in particular linking this to petroleum, and solidarist norms. Well-connected Norwegian 
climate justice translators quickly vernacularised (sometimes literally translating) 
klimarettferdighet given their participation in global networks (including NCA in the ACT 
Alliance). These translators walk the line between encouragement and critique of 
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Norway’s international climate positioning, finding spaces where movements can turn 
hegemonic statist, national(ist) frames inward, decentring climate discourses by 
highlighting Norway’s structural links to climate injustice. In these hegemonic processes, 
climate justice and the norms through which it is vernacularised are open to cooption. 
Increasingly, climate justice has moved to transition discourses. Rights language helps 
concretise diagnostic responsibility frames (especially intergenerational rights and 
GDRs) and, increasingly, draw attention to domestic justice, drawing on civic 
participatory (including the church’s active social role), and social democratic norms of 
negotiating state-led transitions through public participation and tripartite cooperation 
to build welfare around labour and socioeconomic rights — thus building on values that 
underpinned the petroleum industry’s development. Ultimately, klimarettferdighet has 
helped vernacularise UNFCCC technical-diplomatic language, opening for applying rights 
to climate change. 
However, klimarettferdighet remains an activist vernacular. Hegemonic state-industry 
narratives often dominate, repackaging Norwegian petroleum as not only a climate 
solution, but an aspect of global climate (and energy) justice. Recognition of justice 
issues related to a transition for petroleum workers and communities has not yet 
encouraged these workers and communities, or their unions, to join klimarettferdighet 
alliances in significant numbers. Nevertheless, broadening klimarettferdighet into 
prognostic, transformative critiques provides significant potential for furthering positive, 
prefigurative alternatives to elite statist climate initiatives, and thus fertile ground for 
rights.  
Evidence increasingly suggests that ‘equity and environmental justice have more 
resonance with people than appeals to self-interest (…) particularly, if they hold broader 
definitions of community and place’.139 However, we must not underestimate the 
difficulty of deconstructing hegemonic frames that merge community and place with 
self-interest, like petroleum’s position in Norwegian narratives of prosperity and 
equality. Legal pluralist analysis tentatively suggests a hybrid of climate justice with 
Norwegian norms of active civil society and social movement involvement in 
socioeconomic transformations and the welfare state provide new discourses for 
tackling climate change, confronting global justice issues through resonant frames. 
Rights proponents must be cognisant of such possibilities if they wish to influence 
transitions to avert catastrophic climate change and consequently deliver on rights’ 
transformative promise.  
 
                                                        
139 Cindy Isenhour, ‘The Politics of Climate Knowledge: Sir Giddens, Sweden and the Paradox of Climate 
(In)Justice’ (2013) 18(2) International Journal of Justice and Sustainability 201, 210-212. 
